THE CONCEPT OF “CRIME” IN THE CONTEXT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF LEGAL ENTITIES

Abstract

The article is devoted to the dogmatic justification of the applicability of the concept of “crime” in the context of criminal liability of legal entities. Based on a systemic analysis of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia, the article demonstrates that the substantive basis of a legal entity’s criminal liability cannot be mechanically equated with a crime committed by a natural person, since it is constructed not through the logic of personal factual commission, but through a special statutory mechanism of normative attribution. It is argued that, with respect to a legal entity, the more accurate formulation is “an act prohibited by criminal law and attributed to a legal entity,” as this makes it possible to distinguish between the predicate criminally prohibited act of a natural person and the substantive basis of the legal entity’s liability. The proposed approach is aimed at ensuring internal conceptual consistency, legal certainty, the principle of legality, and practical clarity in charge formulation, without undermining the criminal-law nature of the institution of liability of legal entities.