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TYPES OF MODALITY AND ITS INCONSISTENCIES

One of the linguistic disagreements of modality is the diversity of its types. Several directions and types of modalities have emerged in linguistics over the years, distinguishing between the practical and semantic values of the modalities. While exploring the category of modality and its types it becomes clear that some types of modalities create scepticism full of some unresolved questions which leads to misinterpretation and misclassification of the modality types. This paper analyses types of modalities and reveals certain problematics

Key words: modality, irrealis, realis, epistemic, dynamic, deontic, intersubjective, subjective, objective.

Introduction

Modality is an indivisible part of linguistics and though there is an abundance of articles or research work on it, there are often contrasting theories about the types of modalities; this cannot be ignored or briefly addressed since it is a central category in linguistics. The above-mentioned problem is probably explained by the fact that the category of modality is in constant movement and change which is maybe the reason for this problem. Throughout the development of the linguistic studies of modality, we see that many linguists have different points of view about its types and objectiveness and subjectiveness.

Speaking about the types of modality we see that there are traditional types of modality accepted by most of the linguists, however, we also see that linguists offer new types of modality which is sometimes confusing. This means that sometimes the real line between its types is obscure which can harm linguistic

analysis of any speech from the point of view of modality.

Another problem is the objective and subjective modality, which, even though being interpreted well enough by different linguists, still needs to set clear lines between them. In this article, we will reveal existing problems related to the types of modalities based on the theories and provisions put forward by different linguists. We tried also to explain the nuances of modal verbs showing obligation, permission, probability, possibility etc, because the same modal verbs can have various meanings in different sentences.

The article contains two sections and a conclusion; In the first section, we tried to analyse the problem of subjective and objective modality: if it is a subtype or orientation/ direction and what the role of intersubjectivity is and where it should be. In the next section, we mainly focused on types of modalities and the confusion and inconsistencies we have in regard to it. Following the two sections, we provided a conclusion after having explored, analysed, and explained the questions that we put forward.

Methodology

The present research is based on qualitative and comparative methodological approaches which is mainly based on the work of Western linguists such as F.R Palmer, Nuyts, Bybee, W. Abraham, Lyons, and others. Through contextual, evaluative research of the qualitative methodological approach we tried to explain the above-mentioned problems. The study has been conducted by using a linguistic- analytical research method as well.

Subjective and Objective Modalities: Types or Orientations?

Subjectivity and objectivity are indivisible part of modality. No linguists will confirm that there is a sentence without modality and that the modality can completely lack subjectivity or objectivity, since the latter is inherent to our speech which means that the sentences composed by human beings express either the speaker's imagination, expectations or just express a fact. In Western literature it is known as realis or irrealis. In Armenian and Russian linguistics, it is known as subjective and objective modality. Though subjective modality is more visible, objective modality is also important since through it we can express the objectivity of the realm.

When talking about modality, the first thing that immediately catches our attention is whether subjective/objective modality is a type or an orientation. This is because we see that there are different interpretations about this in linguistics and that they sometimes contradict each other. This kind of contradiction and disagreement creates vagueness which complicates further differentiation of subjective and objective modality.

For some linguists, subjective and objective modalities are types (Heyvaert, 2003) and for others they are orientations. (Halliday, 1970) (Hengeveld, 1989).

Butler, for example, notes that there is a distinction between subjective and objective types of modalities in FG and FSG. However, the author thinks that in this case it is necessary to understand not the type, but the direction of the sentence (Butler, 2003).

This allows us to think that one must understand the semantic meaning of the types of modality and distinguish if the speaker expressing his/her personal thoughts or mentioning a fact; namely if the sentence has subjective or objective directions regardless of what type of modality it belongs to. Only after that distinction can one understand what kind of modality the sentence belongs to. We are more inclined to think that these are the two main orientations in which the types of modalities have nested, which, by the nature of their application, are related to either a subjective or objective reality. From this point of view, Palmer's attitude towards subjective/objective modality or, as he calls it 'realis-irrealis' modality coincides with our point of view. The author puts forward two main directions regarding modality: irrealis-realism, that is, unreal-real modality. In the dictionary of linguistic terms, the use of 'realis' is defined as the fact of a proposition, which shows perseverance and the truth of the proposition. The other direction 'irrealis' shows the unreality in the sentence, being expressed by probability and desire. But the picture is different in the case of Lyons' interpretation.

He considers subjective/objective modality to be an epistemic subtype of modality (Lyons, 1977). In the work of Verstraete, we see that the author, discussing objective-subjective modality and talking about the types, distinguishes, for example, deontic subjective modality and deontic objective modality (Verstraete, 2007). Both of them consider subjective and objective modality to be a subtype of deontic and epistemic types of modalities.

We have another point of view on it, because the subjective-objective modality has a wider field of application and can be found in any sentence regardless if it is a deontic modality or not, which is evidenced by many linguists (Блинкова, 2020) (Ворончихина, 2017). It is explained by the fact that not all the sentences belong to the deontic or epistemic type of modality, but all sentences adhere either subjective or objective modality. Deontic modality shows obligation or permission, for example, '*You must go*' (obligation) or '*You are free now so you can go*' (permission). The sentences adhere to subjective modality and belong to the deontic type of modality. However, when we say '*Washington is the capital of the United States*' it is not deontic modality but still adheres to objective modality where the preposition relates to the reality and shows facts. A modality can be called deontic subjective modality just to show the type which is deontic and the orientation which is subjective modality; however, considering subjective and objective modality as subtypes is baseless since the type of modality prevails for the same reason, we mentioned above according to which subjective and objective modality is an inseparable part of the utterance. Yet according to their modality types sentences can be different like. i.e., epistemic modality, deontic, dynamic root and many other types of modality.

Speaking about subjective and objective modality, Frawley, offers the idea of intersubjective modality which is quite an interesting interpretation. According to the author, the difference between subjectivity and intersubjectivity is that the latter is impersonal.

For example: *I think they will come (subjective)*

It is said they will come (intersubjective) (W.Farwley, 2008).

From our point of view there exists intersubjectivity but it cannot be a type or orientation. We think that, by their nature, sentences or utterances are either subjective or objective, namely belong to one of these orientations. What refers to intersubjectivity we think that it is just a differentiation that lies between objective and subjective modality. This means that the sentence by its essence is neither a subjective sentence 100% nor an objective one.

In this case we will have the following image:

Subjective	← Intersubjective →	Objective
<i>Personal</i>	<i>Impersonal</i>	<i>Fact</i>
I think he is Spanish. /	It is said / he is Spanish	He is Spanish

When we say, ‘*I think*’, we express our conceptualization of what we think or try to imagine. We speak about something which is not certain. When we say ‘*He is Spanish*’ this means that we know that the person is Spanish and we just point out that the fact, and it is neither an opinion nor imagination and when we say ‘*it is said*’ it means that we tend to believe he is Spanish and at the same time we accept it as a reality. The impersonal form is a mix of objectivity and subjectivity showing neutrality. However, we do not tend to think that intersubjectivity is an orientation or subtype and it is highly debatable to name it as such. On the other hand, we cannot reject that it does not exist.

Types of Modalities

Types of modalities have been discussed by many prominent linguists, such as Palmer (Palmer, 2001), Van der Auwera (Auwera, 2009), W.Abraham and E.Leiss, (Abraham, 2008) Hoyer (Hoyer L. , 2014), Nuyts (Nuyts J. , 2001) and others. There are three traditional types of modalities in linguistics: dynamic modality, deontic modality, and epistemic modality. (Linden A. , 2012).

Epistemic Modality and Root Modality

The term epistemic comes from the Greek word episteme, which means ‘to know’. It relates to knowledge and beliefs, expresses more an opinion than a fact. That is, it expresses the speaker’s opinion about everything that is known (I. Ni-

iniluoto, 2004) (Li R. , 2004).

From this point of view, Lyons' comment is remarkable. He thinks that epistemic modality expresses the speaker's attitude to the content of the proposition. Nuyts states that epistemic modality expresses the estimation of the probability of an event, which is based on neutral or agnostic circumstances, where there is no clarity, and the estimation of the probability fluctuates between 'negative' and 'positive'. Nuyts notes that epistemic modality often leaves linguists confused (Nuyts, 2001). This is because, sometimes, it is difficult to clearly outline the modal verbs that express epistemic modality.

The Russian linguists Blokh and Averina interpret epistemic modality as: *'Epistemic modality refers to the system of modal grammatical categories, its semantics contains the speaker's assessment of the degree of probability of a fact in the past / present / future (subjective epistemic modality) or in a timeless perspective (objective epistemic modality)* (Блох М.Я., 2011).

Bondarko's attitude resonates with Bloch and Averina's standpoint, and he thinks that epistemic modality is a functional semantic category, which is a part of the structure of subjective modality showing the assessment of the speaker's knowledge and anything connected with it (Бондарко, 1971).

Palmer offers several types of epistemic modality, propositional and event modality. Speaking about propositional modality, the author mentions that it expresses the speaker's attitude towards the real-true value of the factual status of the proposition. About epistemic modality, Palmer explains that it reflects the speaker's judgment on the actual status of the proposition. The author, later, summarizes these types into a whole type called propositional modality, in which the difference is that the epistemic modality is directly comparative to the speaker's judgments about the fact of the proposition, and the evidential is based on the evidence stemming from the proposition.

According to Palmer, epistemic modality and evidential modality are a part of prepositional modality, meanwhile for other linguists, epistemic modality is considered a separate type (Palmer F. R., 2001). As different linguists have other interpretations that sometimes oppose each other, creates the atmosphere of confusion.

It should be noted that linguists seem to agree unanimously on the existence of the epistemic type of modality, but apparently different linguists have different approaches. On epistemic modality, German linguist Kratzer puts forward the idea of non-epistemic modality. Kratzer specifically mentions that if we use an epistemic modal verb, it means that we are interested in what is possible or what should be happen in the world. This means that we value what we know or are aware of. If we use a circumstantial modal, we are interested in what is possible and should be done based on certain circumstances (Vera, 2020).

Meanwhile Palmer puts forward the following subtypes of epistemic modality:

Speculative subtype: *when the speaker is uncertain and does not express*

his/her thoughts clearly, for example 'Shelia may know about it' .

Deductive subtype: *when the speaker makes a clear judgment based on evidence, for example 'Shelia must know about it'.*

Assumptive: *It is the speaker's judgment based on what the speaker knows about the event, for example 'Sheila is good at history, she will know when it has happened'.* (Palmer F. , 2001).

In linguistics, from a grammatical point of view, root modality is put forward. This type of modality includes concepts such as permission and obligation as well as probability and necessity. Often the semantic fields of epistemic and root modalities are intertwined. The difference between epistemic and root modality is that the former expresses the speaker's confidence or distrust in the veracity of the proposition.

According to Bybee and Fleischman's point of view, the difference between the two lies in the domain of the semantic field they express. According to them, root modality and epistemic modality are divided into semantic notions of necessity / obligation and opportunity/ permission (Joan L. Bybee, 1995).

The problem here, however, is that like in many languages, in both English and Spanish, the same modal verb can have different meanings. On the other hand, this phenomenon is an advantage as the semantic field of the given linguistic phenomenon is wider; however, it can be confusing for the precise definition of epistemic and root modality. For example, the English modal '*must*' can express both probability and obligation. The same can be seen with the Spanish verb '*deber*' or the Armenian verb '*պէտք է / petq e*'.

Examples: (1) *You must sign it (obligation–root modality).*

(1) *You worked a lot; you must be tired (probability– epistemic modality).*

(2) *Tienes que firmarlo (root modality).*

(2) *Has trabajado mucho, deberías estar cansado (epistemic modality).*

(3) *Դու պէտք է ստորագրես դա: / Dou petq e storagres da/ (root modality).*

(3) *Դու շատ էս աշխատել, պէտք է , որ հոգնած լինես: Dou shat es ashxatel, petq e, vor hognats lines (epistemic modality).*

Of these examples, the first sentence of all three examples shows obligation which is expressed through '*must*', (tener que, petq e) modal verb, but then we see that the same modal verb also shows probability which means that the meaning of the sentence can be shifted from one to another type of modality. We see the same tendency both in Spanish and Armenian. According to W. Abraham and E. Leiss, in general, root modality is like epistemic modality as both express speaker's feelings, beliefs, and convictions, and both semantic domains include notions of necessity and opportunity. However, the semantic field of root modality is narrower than that of epistemic modality (Werner Abraham, 2008). According to

Zagona, epistemic/root modality can be distinguished by the fact that the root modals are subject-oriented, and the epistemic modals are speaker-oriented modals, which expresses the speaker's attitude towards the factuality of proposition (Jacqueline Guéron, 2008).

Examples: *You must win the battle (root modality).*
I have not seen her for a long time, she must not be here (epistemic modality).

In the first example, the emphasis of the sentence is on the subject . The modal verb *'must'* express the subject's commitments, and the sentence expresses compulsion. In the second sentence we see that it mainly expresses the speaker's opinion and assumption.

Dynamic Modality

Dynamic modality, derived from the Greek word *'dynamos'* *'strength'*, expresses the strength and ability of the subject participant of the clause such as *'He can play the guitar'* (Linden: 2012). This means that it is intended to show what the subject can and is able to do in a sentence or an utterance. This is mainly related to physical and mental capacity. For example, when we say, *'Jimmy can speak in three languages'* it is a mental ability, and when we say, *'Jimmy can run quickly'*, it is a physical ability. Dynamic modality also expresses the circumstances that may arise from the sentence requirement or a necessity.

Dynamic modality is also known in linguistics as facultative modality and inherent modality. (Goossens, 1985), (Hengeveld K. , 1988). When talking about dynamic modality, one should also keep in mind the fact that semantic nuances may be similar to other types of modalities. This means while analysing a sentence, it is important to understand whether the action is a matter of necessity, ability or need. The main indicator here is, in our deep conviction, that dynamic modality expresses a more objective reality, which cannot be said about epistemic modality. For example, *'You can take a loan now if it is strongly necessary, the bank gives loans without any mortgage'*. Here the sentence indicates an ability conditioned by inherent need. This shows the capabilities of the bank and the action that arises out of necessity. On the other hand, the fact that the bank lends without mortgage is objective. Here we are already dealing with the fact, which is the first distinction for objective modality. Nuyts points out that, unlike epistemic and deontic modalities, dynamic modality is a binary modality and contains only two semantic values – probability and necessity and there is no other connecting link in the middle of these two concepts.

According to Nuyts dynamic modality has three subtypes:

Participant-inherent dynamic modality (involving the ascription of abilities/capacities or needs/necessities to the first-argument participant,

which is usually the agent).

For example: *Swimmers **can** swim for hours, but not everyone can endure to the end.*

Participant-imposed dynamic modality (indicating the abilities/capacities or needs/necessities of a participant which are ‘determined by the local circumstances (and which may thus be partly beyond the power and control) of that participant’.

For example: *The company **must** be liquidated due to financial problems.*

Situational dynamic modality involves the indication of ‘a potential or a necessity/inevitability inherent in the situation described in the clause as a whole’ (Nuyts: 2006)

For example: ***It is possible** to transfer the money in advance if necessary.*

The three subtypes of dynamic modality are very confusing, and it is sometimes impossible to understand how to distinguish these subtypes. This is where we deal with the difficulty putting clear lines between the types and subtypes of modality. Views on participant-inherent dynamic modality, participant-imposed dynamic modality and situational dynamic modality are not shared by all the linguists and this also creates additional problems in defining the latter.

Dynamic modality in Anglo-American linguistics is known as root modality, but our research and analysis show that dynamic modality have taken a separate direction at present. Nuyts notes that the same term seems to be used for deontic modality, while in modern linguistics the term agent-oriented has emerged for root modality. (Nuyts:2006)

Deontic Modality

Deontic modality comes from the Greek word ‘*deon*’, which means obligatory duty. (Li:2004). According to Lyons, deontic modality is a modality that expresses the necessity or probability of action presented by morally responsible agents. Lyons sees it in the domain of obligation and permission (Lyons J. , 1977), for example ‘*You may open the door*’ and ‘*You have to open the door*’. The first example expresses permission and second one obligation. Stefanescu notes that deontic modality is a discourse-oriented non-epistemic modality. She subdivides deontic modality into *directive, commissive, imperative, volitive and evaluative* subtypes. Directive deontic modality deals with deontic possibility and deontic necessity. Commissive deontic modality refers to promises and undertakings (Stefanescu, 2008).

Deontic modality is related to the probability and necessity of actions due to what the speaker gives permission to do something or imposes some actions for the future (Hoye L. , 2014).

For example: ‘*Let me sing*’. (*permission*).

Other Types of Modality

In addition to above-mentioned types, linguists have suggested other types or subtypes of modality. For example, Bybee puts forward '*agent-oriented*', and '*speaker-oriented*' modality. According to the author agent-oriented modality 'reports the existence of internal and external conditions on an agent with respect to the completion of the action expressed in the main predicate'.

Agent-oriented modality can be expressed both grammatically and with word forms. The basic concepts of the domain of this type of modality are obligation, necessity, ability, and desire (Joan Bybee, 1994).

Within the scope of agent-oriented modality obligation we understand that external social conditions force the agent to perform the duty in the subordinate clause, for example '*All pupils must pass the exam to be promoted to the next semester*' (obligation).

In the case of necessity, when physical conditions force the agent to perform it in the subordinate part of the sentence, for example '*If you want to sing it well, you need to practice more*' (necessity). In the case of ability and desire, external conditions are the reason for the agent to perform the actions coming from it. For example, '*I can play the piano only, but no other instruments*' (ability) and '*I wish I were rich to be able to help poor children, so I wouldn't see how they suffer*' (desire).

Speaker-oriented modality does not express the terms of existence of the agent but instead allows the speaker to impose such terms on the addressee. According to Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca the grammatical terms of speaker-oriented modality are as follows:

Imperative– the speaker gives a direct command to the second person.

Negative– the speaker gives a negative command.

Optative –the speaker expresses a wish in the main clause.

Hortative –the speaker encourages or supports someone to act like that.

Admonitive– the speaker is giving a warning.

Primitive –the speaker permits someone to do something (Joan Bybee Revere Perkins, 1994).

When Plungian and van der Auwera speaking of the semantic domain of epistemic and deontic modalities, suggest the following two types:

Participant-internal modality: This refers to the internal capabilities or necessity of the participant involved in an event. The semantic domain includes possibility and necessity. As refers to the domain of possibility, it is necessary to mention that it should stem from ability.

For example: '*You can obtain it through hard work*'. (possibility)

'The patient needs to eat non-greasy foods for easy digestion'
(necessity).

Participant external modality (semantic domains are possibility and necessity)

As we noticed, the semantics of both participant-internal and participant-external types of modality semantic domains are possibility and necessity (van der Auwera, 1994).

However, in the case of participant-external modality, the term refers to circumstances that are external to the participant. This means that the participant is engaged in the state of affairs which makes the actions possible or necessary. For example, *‘To reach the station you can go via Lincoln Street’* (possibility).

‘To reach the station you have to go via Lincoln Street’ (necessity).

There are also extrinsic and intrinsic subtypes of modality in linguistics. Intrinsic modality involves an action over which a human being has control. Extrinsic modality expresses human judgments about what is likely or unlikely to happen (Westin, 2016). The above-mentioned two types of modality are the dividing line between root and epistemic modalities. Other linguists point out that deontic modality and volition are classified as intrinsic modality. Extrinsic modality includes semantic domains such as probability, necessity, or prediction (Bas Aarts, 2011)

Conclusion

Summarizing the various types and subtypes of modality offered by different linguists according to their semantic fields and types, we have the following table.

MODALITY						
Orientations / Types/ Subtype			Subjective		Objective	
Types	Deontic	Dynamic	Epistemic/non epistemic	Root	Participant-internal	Participant-external
Subtypes		Participant-inherent Participant-imposed Situational	Speculative Deductive Assumptive <hr/> Imperative/non-epistemic/			
Semantic domains	Obligation, Permission	Ability Willingness	Probability, Possibility, Certainty	Obligation Necessity Permission		
Functions	Agent-oriented	Speaker-oriented <hr/> Imperative Negative Optative Hortative Admotive Permitive	Extrinsic	Intrinsic		

As a result of the research, we offer that subjective and objective modality should be considered as orientations of modality. In regard to the types of mo-

ality, we conclude that the variety of the latter only creates obstacles and confusion in differentiation of modality according to their types. Regarding the types of modality, we offer deontic, dynamic, epistemic and root modalities as the main types of modality, and the differentiation should be set based on their semantic fields and exclude some subtypes to escape contradictions and problematics of clear distinction about the types of modalities.

We concluded also that participant–inherent and participant imposed, and situational subtypes of modality should be excluded since they have a much more functional role and can be found not only in dynamic modality but in other types of modality as well.

Based on our conclusions, we propose the following table

MODALITY				
Orientations	Subjective		Objective	
Types	Deontic	Dynamic	Epistemic/non epistemic	Root
Subtypes			Speculative Deductive Assumptive <hr/> Imperative/non-epistemic/	
Semantic domains	Obligation, Permission	Ability Willingness	Probability, Possibility Certainty	Obligation Necessity Permission
Functions	A g e n t – oriented	Speaker-oriented Participant–inherent Participant–imposed Situational	Extrinsic Participant–internal	Intrinsic Participant– external

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Անուշ Մարտիրոսյան

Եվրասիա միջազգային համալսարանի օլտար լեզուների և գրականության ամբիոնի դասախոս, նույն ամբիոնի հայցորդ
 էլ. հասցե՝ anush.martirosyan92@gmail.com

ԵՂԱՆԱԿԱՎՈՐՄԱՆ ՏԵՍԱԿՆԵՐԸ ԵՎ ԴՐԱ ՀԵՏ ԿԱՊՎԱԾ ԱՆՀԱՄԱՊԱՏԱՍԻԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԸ

Եղանակավորման լեզվական տարածայնություններից մեկը դրա տեսակների բազմազանությունն է: Լեզվաբանության մեջ տարիների ընթացքում ի հայտ են եկել մի շարք ուղղություններ և եղանակավորման տեսակներ՝ տարբերակելով վերջինիս գործնական և իմաստային արժեքները: Եղանակավորման կատեգորիան և դրա տեսակներն ուսումնասիրելիս պարզ է դառնում, որ եղանակավորման որոշ տեսակներ ստեղծում են թերահավատություն՝ լի որոշ չլուծված հարցերով, ինչը հանգեցնում է վերջինիս տեսակների սխալ մեկնաբանման և դասակարգման: Սույն հոդվածը վերլուծում է եղանակավորման տեսակները և բացահայտում դրա հետ կապված որոշակի խնդիրները:

Հիմնաբառեր. եղանակավորում, անիրական, իրական, էպիստեմիկ, դինամիկ, դեոնտիկ, միջտուրյեկտիվ, սուրյեկտիվ, օրյեկտիվ:

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ТИПЫ МОДАЛЬНОСТИ И ЕЕ НЕСООТВЕТСТВИЯ

Одним из языковых несоответствий модальности является многообразие ее видов. На протяжении многих лет в лингвистике возникло несколько направлений и типов модальностей, различающих практическое и семантическое значение модальностей. При изучении категории модальности и ее видов становится ясно, что некоторые их виды порождают скептицизм, полный некоторых нерешенных вопросов, что приводит к неправильному толкованию и неправильной классификации типов модальностей. В статье анализируются типы модальностей и выявляются определенные проблемы.

Ключевые слова: модальность, реальный, не реальный, эпистемический, динамический, деонтический, интересубъективный, субъективный, объективный.

Հոդվածը խմբագրություն է ներկայացվել՝ 2022թ. դեկտեմբերի 5-ին:

Հոդվածը հանձնվել է գրախոսման՝ 2022թ. դեկտեմբերի 11-ին:

Հոդվածն ընդունվել է տպագրության՝ 2022թ. դեկտեմբերի 22-ին: